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Abst rac t  
We use the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to assess the sectoral effects 
of (1) a 25 percent unilateral reduction of military expenditures in the individual NATO 
countries and (2) a 25 percent multilateral reduction of military expenditures in all of 
the NATO countries combined. Our principal findings suggest that the overall effects 
of the unilateral and multilateral reductions are not substantial and that the results of 
the two reductions are qualitatively similar. The sectoral results, which are also broadly 
similar in the two experiments, suggest that sectors such as basic metals and metal 
products, durable goods, and community, social, and personal services might be in 
need of transitional adjustment assistance for displaced workers in the event that the 
reductions in military expenditures would in fact be carried out. 
With the end of the Cold War and at tendant  f ragmentat ion of the former  
Soviet  Union, Soviet  military inf luence no longer poses a grave threat  
to international security. The destruct ion of Iraq's military capabi l i t ies 
and the open ing  of the Israeli-Arab d ia logue may also have served to 
reduce the potential  for large-scale confl ict in the Middle East. The con- 
f luence of these remarkable changes  suggests  that there may now be 
cons iderab le  scope for reduct ion in military expendi tures  in the NATO 
member  countr ies. Accordingly,  there is interest in the aggregate  and 
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sectoral impacts that might be experienced in the world's major indus- 
trialized and developing countries if significant reductions in military 
expenditures indeed prove to be possible. 1 
Using the computational general equilibrium (CGE) Michigan Model 
of World Production and Trade, we first investigate the impact of a 
25 percent unilateral reduction in military spending for each NATO 
country. Then, we investigate the impact of a 25 percent multilateral 
reduction in military spending in all of the NATO countries combined. An 
important advantage in using the Michigan Model is that it incorporates 
the effects of international trade and allows for price and exchange 
rate responses as well as primary input substitution possibilities. The 
Michigan Model thus provides a richer insight into the sectoral effects 
stemming from changes in military expenditures than has been provided 
by earlier research. 2 
Previous work has generally compensated for changes in military ex- 
penditures by changing nonmilitary government purchases. However, 
as discussed in Haveman, Deardorff, and Stern (1992), prior episodes 
of substantial reductions in U.S. military expenditures did not follow this 
path. We therefore assumed in our aforementioned work that reduc- 
tions in government military spending were compensated by shifting 
expenditures to various components of final demand, including: (1) 
nondefense government spending; (2) private consumption; (3) in- 
vestment; and (4) proportional reallocation across all of the foregoing 
expenditure components. In this paper, we adopt the last of these 
expenditure shifts. 
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 1, we present a brief 
description of the Michigan Model and discuss elements of it that are 
of particular importance to our study. In Section 2, we discuss some 
assumptions underlying our computational experiments, and in Sec- 
tion 3, some theoretical considerations that pertain to our experiments. 
The computational results are presented in Section 4. Our conclusions 
and implications of the results are discussed in Section 5. 
1. Overview of the Michigan Model 
The theoretical structure and equations of the Michigan Model are 
described in detail in Deardorff and Stern (1986, pp. 9-36 and 235- 
247; 1990, pp. 9-35). For our purposes here, we present a brief 
overview of the model and call attention to some of its features that are 
pertinent to the present analysis. 
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In designing the Michigan Model, the objective was to take into ac- 
count as many of the microeconomic interconnections among indus- 
tries and countries as possible. This disaggregated general equilibrium 
framework enables us to examine a variety of economic issues that most 
other computational models cannot address, either because they are 
too highly aggregated, or because they are specified only in partial 
equilibrium terms. 
1.1. Data and parameters 
The version of the model used here includes 23 tradable and six non- 
tradable industries in 18 industrialized and 16 developing countries, 
plus an aggregate sector representing the rest of the world. 3 We use 
a base of 1980 data on trade, production, and employment for all 
34 countries, plus constructed measures of the coverage of nontariff 
barriers (NTBs) for the 18 industrialized countries. 
The import and export data are adapted from United Nations trade 
tapes, with concordances that relate the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SlTC) to our version of the International Standard Indus- 
trial Classification (ISIC) categories. Information on the gross value 
of production and employment by ISIC sector is directly calculated 
or estimated from the United Nations Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) pub- 
lications on national accounts and labor statistics, and various national 
statistical sources. 
Our input-output coverage currently includes national tables for all of 
the industrialized countries of the model except Switzerland. They are 
taken from various years ranging from 1975 for Japan and members 
of the EC-9 to 1982 for Finland. The 1977 table for the United States 
is applied to Switzerland. For the developing countries, our coverage 
currently includes separate tables for Brazil (1975), Chile (1977), India 
(1973), Israel (1977), Korea (1980), Mexico (1980), Portugal (1981), 
Singapore (1973), Spain (1980), Taiwan (1986), Turkey (1973), and 
Yugoslavia (1976). The Brazilian table is applied to the remaining 
developing countries. The use of national tables allows for differences 
in technology among the countries included in the model. 4 
In general, the coefficients of explanatory variables that appear in the 
model are calculated from data on production, trade, and employment 
by sector in each country, from the input-output matrices, and from 
relevant published estimates of demand and substitution elasticities. 
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1.2. The model structure 
The model is best thought of as composed of two parts: the country 
system and the world system. The country system contains separate 
blocks of equations for the individual tradable and nontradable sectors 
for each country, and the world system contains a single set of equations 
for individual tradable sectors for the world as a whole. The country 
blocks are used first to determine each country's supplies and demands 
for goods and currencies on world markets as functions of world prices, 
exchange rates, and exogenous variables. The supply and demand 
functions for each country are then combined to provide the input 
to the world system that permits world prices and exchange rates to 
be determined. 
The world system is the less complicated of the two systems. We start 
with the export supply and import demand functions from the country 
equations, which depend on world prices and exchange rates. To get 
world prices, we add these supplies and demands across all countries 
and set the difference equal to net demand from the rest of the world. 
To obtain exchange rates, where these are flexible, we add the value of 
excess supply across all of the industries in a country and equate the 
resulting trade balance to an exogenously given capital flow. Once we 
obtain the world prices for each tradable industry and the exchange rate 
for each country, we enter them back into the separate country blocks 
in order to determine the rest of the relevant country-specific variables. 
1.3. Description of the exogenous change variables 
The Michigan Model can be used to analyze price and quantity re- 
sponses to a number of exogenous changes in the world trading envi- 
ronment. These changes can be represented through the use of some 
18 exogenous variables, each referring to a different change in the 
trading environment. These variables include, for example, changes in 
import tariffs, changes in export taxes, changes in exchange rates where 
they are exogenous, and changes in the aforementioned capital flows. 
For the current analysis, however, we use only two exogenous change 
variables, both representing particular kinds of shifts in demand. One is 
an inter-industry shift variable, denoted ee, that describes a reallocation 
of final demand across industries. The other is an intra-industry shift 
variable, denoted e/~, that captures a shift of demand within an industry 
from home-produced goods to imports. A formal statement of the roles 
that these two shift parameters play !n the Michigan Model is available 
from the authors on request. 
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2. Computational experiments and assumptions 
In periods when military expenditures are reduced, the question nat- 
urally arising is, what happens to nonmilitary expenditures? There 
are principally three macroeconomic policies that could accompany 
a reduction in military expenditures: (1) increase other spending; (2) 
reduce taxes; or (3) reduce government borrowing, s That is, first, poli- 
cymakers could redistribute the expenditure to other forms of govern- 
ment spending-for example, to human or physical resources. Sec- 
ond, the reduction in expenditure could be matched by a reduction 
in government receipts, thus increasing civilian consumption. Finally, 
the reduced expenditure could be used to reduce a budget deficit 
or increase a surplus, reducing interest rates and thereby stimulating 
investment. As Steuerle and Wiener (1990) have noted, the three post- 
war periods after 1945 experienced each of these policies, but in rather 
different combinations. 
Given that there have been a variety of macroeconomic responses 
to reductions in military expenditures, it is difficult to determine what 
the appropriate strategy should be in modeling such expenditure re- 
ductions. The reason this is important is that the effect on the sectoral 
composition of trade and employment due to a reduction in military 
spending depends crucially on the assumptions one makes about the 
accompanying macroeconomic policies. Because the Michigan Model 
does not formally allow for changes in interest rates or domestic taxes, 
the scenarios chosen for analyzing reductions in military expenditures 
are implemented by exogenously altering the composition of final de- 
mand. Thus, as already mentioned in Haveman, Deardorff, and Stern 
(1992), we made allowances for shifts in military spending to several 
categories of final demand, including consumption, investment, nonmil- 
itary government spending, and a proportional shift across all sectors of 
nonmilitary final demand. In the present paper, we confine our attention 
to the latter case of the proportional shift. 
We concentrate on two scenarios: (1) a 25 percent unilateral reduc- 
tion of military expenditures in the individual NATO countries and (2) 
a 25 percent multilateral reduction of military expenditures in all of the 
NATO countries combined. 6 Each scenario is based on a 25 percent re- 
duction in the level of 1989 military expenditures in each country. These 
reductions are taken as a uniform percentage of military expenditures 
allocated to each of the 29 sectors being modelled in each country. 
The reduction in military expenditures is prorated proportionally to all 
three sectors of final demand, namely, consumption, investment, and 
nonmilitary government expenditure. 
In interpreting the computational results presented below, it is impor- 
tant to note the following assumptions that have been made: 
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1. The level of aggregate expenditure is constant. 
2. Capital stocks are fixed for each industry, on the grounds that the 
time period under investigation is too short for changes in investment 
to be realized as additions to the capital stock. 
3. Real wages are assumed to be flexible, i.e., labor markets are per- 
mitted to clear. 
4. All defense expenditure is assumed to have been allocated to do- 
mestic industry. 
5. Exchange rates are modeled as flexible, except for a number of 
developing countries. 
Some of these assumptions are in need of further explanation or 
justification. First, the assumption that aggregate expenditure is held 
constant is necessary because the microeconomlc orientation of the 
Michigan Model makes it inappropriate for discussing macroeconomic 
phenomena such as the determination of aggregate expenditure or 
employment. A further consequence of the microeconomic nature of 
the model is assumption (3). Our results are all dependent on con- 
stant aggregate employment, which is assured by allowing for flexibility 
in real wages. There are alternative methods of maintaining constant 
employment, such as allowing the level of final demand to adjust ap- 
propriately, but these adjustments would de-emphasize the role played 
by the differences in the distribution of military spending and other 
sources of final demand. 
Assumption (4) is designed to reflect the preference that most coun- 
tries give to domestic manufacturers and suppliers when contracts are 
signed and purchases are made. Given this preference, we believe that 
the average propensity to import of the national defense establishment 
is significanlty less than that of final and intermediate demand in the 
aggregate. In the absence of detailed information, we assume that the 
average propensity to import of the national defense establishment is 
equal to zero in all of the countries. 
Implementation of the two policy experiments is conceptualized as a 
shift in the final demand for the output of each of the 29 sectors. The 
first step in each of the scenarios is to appropriately redistribute the 
reduction in military spending. These redistributions of final demand 
are represented in the Michigan Model as changes in the demand share 
parameters of the consumers' utility function. In what follows, o~j will be 
used to represent the share of final demand attributable to purchases 
from sector j. Given the nature of the model, the proportional change 
in these parameters is needed to reflect the shift in final demand. 
The proportional change variable is obtained by calculating the actual 
share of each sector in final demand (oL0~, j = 1, . . . ,  29) and the final 
demand share of each sector once the defense spending has been 
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redistributed (~lj, j = 1, ..., 29)° The proportional change is then 
calculated as: 
e~j - ~  d~j = O~ l j  - O~oj (j = 1, . . . ,  29). (1) 
~j ~oj 
In order to calculate the inter- and intra-industry shift parameters that 
are needed for each sector in each country, five pieces of data are 
required: GNP for each country, the volume of defense purchases, 
the distribution of GNP and defense procurement across sectors, and 
the share of imports in final domestic demand for each sector. Data 
on the share of imports in final demand were obtained from data al- 
ready present in the model. The sources for the remaining data are 
detailed below. 
The calculation of eo~, which is the percent change in demand for each 
sector, requires the distribution and levels of defense spending and final 
demand for each country. Data on aggregate military expenditures and 
GNP for each country for 1989 were obtained from the 1990 U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) publication. In order to cal- 
culate the demand shift parameters for each of the 29 industries in each 
country, it was necessary to distribute the aggregate military expendi- 
ture and GNP data across the industries modelled. The distribution of 
GNP was accomplished through the use of the input-output tables al- 
ready employed in the model. The aggregate obtained was distributed 
to replicate the share in final demand for each of the 29 sectors. 
Disaggregated estimates of the distribution of defense spending were 
employed for the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and West 
Germany and are from The Survey of Current Business (1990), Herring 
(1989), Barker et al. (1990), and Filip-Kohn et al. (1980), respectively. 
Leontief and Duchin (1983) provide estimates of the proportion of the 
ACDA data on aggregate military expenditures that correspond to 12 
categories. We, in turn, concorded the categories in each of the 
aforementioned publications to our industrial classification. 
As noted above, defense purchases are assumed to be made entirely 
from domestic production. The shift of expenditure away from defense 
will therefore be accompanied by an exogenous increase in imports. 
As a result, we need to adjust the fraction of new expenditure that now 
goes towards the purchase of imported goods. We assume that each 
category of total demand in an industry purchases imports in the same 
percentages as that of final demand in that industry as a whole. 7 
3. Some theoretical considerations 
Having stated some important assumptions underlying our experiments, 
it may be helpful to provide a theoretical discussion of some of the 
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interactions that are present in the Michigan Model. This can be done 
with the aid of the partial equilibrium supply and demand diagrams 
shown in Fig. 1, assuming initially that there is a unilateral reduction in 
military expenditure. 
The top panel of Fig. 1 shows the market for home-produced goods 
in a representative industry. Supply and demand in such a home mar- 
ket depend, of course, on the home price, but the positions of the 
supply and demand curves also depend on various prices of imports. 
This dependence is only shown in the figure for the price of the im- 
ported good in the same industry. This matters for demand because 
of consumer substitution, and it matters for supply because of the use 
of imports as inputs into production. 
The bottom panel shows the markets for exports and imports within 
the same industry. Here the prices and quantities of exports and imports 
are drawn for convenience on the same axis, because in the model they 
are viewed as identical products in the world market. However, within 
the country, imports of an industry are viewed as distinct from exports, 
and there is no reason in general to compare them. Nonetheless, we 
show them being equal initially, partly for convenience and partly to 
enable us, even though inappropriately, to represent the process of 
exchange rate adjustment in this single market context. 
For both exports and imports, the world price in the industry, Pw, 
is translated into domestic currency by multiplying it by the exchange 
rate, R. In the absence of any export taxes or subsidies, this gives the 
export price, Px. The supply of exports depends upon this price, as 
well as on the price in the home market, again because of the use of 
home market goods as inputs into production for export. 8 
The price facing importers, PM, is also given by RPw, except that it 
is augmented by t, representing the ad valorem tariff together with the 
tariff equivalent of any nontariff barrier that may be present. Thus, the 
demand curve is drawn as a function of PM, and, again, its position 
depends on the home price from the other panel. 
A cut in defense expenditure has two effects, as already noted. First, 
depending where defense expenditure was concentrated compared to 
the pattern of expenditure in the category of final demand to which that 
expenditure is shifted, total demand in some industries will rise and in 
other industries will fall. We will look at both cases in turn. Second, 
even in industries in which total demand declines, and certainly in ones 
in which demand expands, there is a shift from defense spending, which 
was devoted exclusively to home goods, to other demand that is spent 
partly on imports. This means that there is an additional shift to the left 
of the home-sector demand curve and shift tO the right of the import 
demand curve. 
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Fig. 1. Partial equilibrium determination of home-sector prices and quantities and of 
exports and imports. 
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Consider, then, an industry in which there has been no defense 
spending. The cut in defense spending will therefore, at initial prices, 
unambiguously increase total demand in that industry, as well as in- 
crease demands for both imported and home produced goods there. 
This is shown in Fig. 2 by the shifts of the two demand curves to 
D~(P °)  and D~(P~). As long as the world price and the exchange 
rate do not change, the prices of exports and imports in the sector 
will remain constant. However, the shift in demand in the home sector 
requires a price increase there, to P~, and this induces a further shift 
in both supply and demand for exports and imports. The demand for 
imports shifts further to the right, to 1 1 DM(PH), due to substitution away 
from higher priced home goods. And the supply of exports shifts to 
the left, to S×(P~), due to the higher prices of inputs from the home 
sector. Thus, the result at this point is a rise in output in the home 
sector, a fall in exports, and a rise in imports. 
These results could change, however, if there is a change in prices 
of exports and imports, though this is not shown in the diagram. If the 
country is large in the world market, then its increased net demand for 
imports will raise the world price, Pw. In addition, if the increase in 
net imports here applies to other industries as well, then the worsening 
of the trade balance will lead to a depreciation of the currency, i.e., a 
rise in R, which will also raise the domestic currency prices of traded 
goods. On the export side, a price increase for either of these reasons 
will tend to offset the decline in exports shown in Fig. 2 and may even 
lead exports, in certain sectors, to increase overall. 
On the import side, the possible price increase for these two reasons 
may, in addition, be enhanced by still another possibility. If the industry 
being considered is covered by a nontariff barrier, then the attempt to 
increase imports will lead to a rise in the tariff equivalent of the barrier, 
and thus to a rise in t, raising the price of imports still further. Thus, 
for three reasons PM may rise, and if it does, the changes in Fig. 2 will 
be further complicated. Such a rise in PM will lead to a further upward 
shift in D]~, plus an upward shift in SH, possibly changing the quantity 
in the home market from that shown in Fig. 2, and surely increasing 
the price still further. The additional price increase will also lead to 
further shifts of supply and demand for trade, and so on. The end 
result cannot therefore, be obtained with certainty from the diagram. 
However, all of these secondary shifts seem unlikely to change in a 
substantial way the results shown in Fig. 2, which may therefore still be 
of use in understanding the results of the more complicated interactions 
captured by the Michigan Model. 
Fig. 3 shows the opposite extreme case, where defense expenditure 
in an industry is cut substantially and only a small amount of new final 
demand is created in the same industry, thus reducing total demand. 
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Fig, 2. Partial equilibrium determination of a cut in defense spending in an industry where 
demand increases. 
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Fig. 3. Partial equlibrium effects of a cut in defense spending in an industry where demand 
decreases. 
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The demand curve in the home sector therefore shifts to the left, to 
1 0 DH(PM), while the demand curve for imports shifts slightly to the right, 
to D~(P~). The price in the home market therefore fails in this case, 
to P~, and this shifts both the supply of exports and the demand for 
imports down. The results, therefore, are a rise in exports and a fall in 
imports; assuming, as shown, that the initial increase in ~mport demand 
is small compared to the effect of the drop in the home, price. 
Here again, there could be further adjustment of prices if there are 
changes in world prices, the exchange rate, or the tariff equivalent of a 
nontariff barrier; in this case, the effects would tend to go in the opposite 
direction from what we discussed in connection with Fig. 2. However, 
since over the entire economy the defense cut replaces spending that 
was only in home sectors with other spending that goes partly to 
imports, the case of a currency depreciation that was considered there 
seems more likely. 
To sum up, our theoretical analysis suggests that home-sector prices 
will rise in some sectors and fall in others due to a shift of expenditure 
out of defense, with corresponding changes in home-sector outputs. 
As a first approximation, imports rise and exports fall in sectors where 
demand expands, while the opposite is likely where demand contracts. 
However, because of the overall shift toward imports with the cut in 
defense expenditure, the currency is likely to depreciate, and this tends 
to raise prices across the board. 
It should be evident from our discussion that the effects of a unilateral 
reduction in military expenditure will depend on a variety of direct and 
indirect responses to the changes in relative prices that occur within 
an individual country, as well as between this country and its trading 
partners. The Michigan Model thus provides a general equilibrium 
framework for computational analysis of a variety of detailed interactions 
that will occur at a sectoral level in each of the countries included in 
the model. When multilateral reductions in military expenditure are 
analyzed, as in our second scenario, the general equilibrium solution 
of the model will reflect the sectoral changes that will occur as the 
countries act in concert rather than unilaterally. We are then able to 
compare the sectoral effects of unilateral and multilateral reductions in 
military expenditure and determine to what extent these effects differ in 
terms of their magnitude and sign (i.e., positive or negative). 
4. Computational results 
The Michigan Model produces results for a wide range of endogenous 
variables that emerge from the calculations as percentage changes 
for each of the 29 sectors. Base year data (1980 in this study) are 
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then used to compute absolute changes for selected variables, e.g., 
exports, imports, and employment. We now turn to the results of our 
two experiments of reductions in military expenditure that are reported 
in Tables 1-3. 
4.1. Scenario I: 25 percent unilateral reduction in individual NATO 
countries 
The aggregate results for both the unilateral and multilateral reductions 
for the individual NATO countries are presented in Table 1. It appears 
that a unilateral 25 percent reduction in defense spending is fairly 
painless in the aggregate for all NATO countries. For the United States 
in particular, there is a marginal reduction in both exports and imports 
and only 0.58 percent of the U.S. labor force would experience some 
dislocation. The effects on the U.S. terms of trade, effective exchange 
rate, and prices are also quite small. 
The changes in overall trade are also quite small in percentage terms, 
but they are interesting because of the differences among countries. 
Both exports and imports contract in the United States and several 
other countries, while they expand in France, Germany, and others. 
The reason for this difference is to be found in the distribution of 
military expenditures across sectors. 
In France, Germany, and other countries, a large proportion of mili- 
tary expenditures is concentrated in the very labor-intensive nontraded 
sector ISlC 9-Community, Social, and Personal Services. As a re- 
sult, when military spending is reduced and shifted to other less labor- 
intensive sectors, the demand for labor falls, causing a drop in the wage. 
This, in turn, makes exports of these countries slightly more competitive, 
their exports expand, and exchange rate adjustments cause imports to 
rise as well. In the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, 
a smaller proportion of military expenditures is in this sector and, with 
a more broad-based drop in military spending, there is no system- 
atic tendency for the wage to change. In these countries, therefore, 
the dominant effect arises from shifting spending from nontradable to 
tradable sectors overall, and that spending tends to displace exports, 
which then decline. Imports then also fall to maintain balanced trade. 
The results in Table 1 are aggregates of the changes that take place 
in the underlying sectors of each country. Table 2 contains the sectoral 
employment results for the two experiments. 9 Looking at the unilateral 
scenario, it appears that employment decreases significantly in net 
percentage terms in basic metal industries (371 and 372), durable 
goods sectors (381,382, 383, 384, and 38A), and community, personal, 
and social services (ISIC 9, which includes government employment). 1° 
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Table I. Aggregate effects on NATO countries due to 25 percent reductions in military 
spending. 
Change Change Labor Percent 
in Exports in Imports Dislocation a Change in 
Effective 
$ MILL. Percent $ MILL. Percent 000 WKR Percent Terms of Ex, Rate b Pdces c 
Trade 
Belgium/ 
Luxembourg Unil. 138.5 0.2 137.4 0.2 19.2 
Multi. 1303 0.2 117.3 0.2 19.3 
Canada Unii. -209.0 -0.3 -204,t -0.3 19.7 
Multi. -264.0 -0.4 -208.3 -0.4 21.6 
Denmark Unil. 22,6 0.1 22.7 0.1 6.9 
Multi. 11.8 0.1 26.2 0.1 9.3 
France UniL 188.6 0.2 174.3 0,1 135.2 
Multi, 259.7 0.2 206.4 0.2 138,1 
Germany Unil. 224.9 0.1 201.2 0.1 103.2 
Multi. 339,5 0.2 104.6 0.1 110.5 
italy UniL 167,2 0.2 164,4 0.2 88,6 
Multi. 204.3 0.3 172.7 0.2 95,7 
Netherlands UniL 64.4 0.1 64.9 0.1 19.3 
Multi. 73,7 0.1 86,9 0.1 19.1 
Norway Unil. 56.7 0.3 46.6 0.3 14.3 
Multi, 63.8 0.4 48.1 0.3 15.! 
Portugal UniL 2,1 0,0 2,t 0.0 27.5 
Multi. 12.0 0.2 12.8 0.1 27,5 
Spain Unil. -27.2 -0.1 -27.1 -0.1 35.2 
Multi. -22.3 -0.1 -35.9 -0.1 35.2 
Turkey Unil. -19.8 -0.8 -19.5 -0,2 38.7 
Mutti. -12.0 -0.4 -3.1 0,0 37.9 
80.4 
79.5 
UniL -858.6 -0.4 -679.8 -0.3 578.0 
Multi. -781.9 -0,3 -541.6 -0.2 582.9 
United Kingdom Unil .  -536.1 -0,5 -534.1 -0.4 
Multi. -437.3 -0.4 -481A -0,4 
United States 
0.49 0,00 0,0 -0.1 
0.49 -0.03 0.1 -0,1 
0.18 0.01 0.0 0.0 
0.20 0,10 0.1 0.0 
0.37 0.00 0.0 -0,1 
0,39 0.08 0.2 -0.1 
0.64 -0.01 0,0 -0.1 
0.65 -0.05 0.1 -0.1 
0.37 -0.01 0.0 -0.2 
0.40 -0.12 0.1 -0,2 
0.43 0.00 0.0 -0.2 
0.47 -0.05 0.1 -0.2 
0.39 0.00 0.0 0.1 
0.39 0,02 -0.1 0.1 
0.75 0.00 0.0 0.0 
0.79 0.05 0.0 O. 1 
0.70 0,00 0.0 0.2 
0.70 0.02 0.0 0.1 
0,32 0.00 0,0 0.0 
0.32 -0.05 0,0 0.1 
0.27 0,00 0.0 0.6 
0.26 0.25 0,0 0.4 
0.32 0.00 0.0 0.5 
0.32 -0.05 -0.5 0=5 
0.58 0=02 0.0 0.1 
0.59 0.05 0.1 0.1 
Notes: a Refers to sum of changes in the home and export sectors within industries. 
b Positive = appreciation. 
c Index of import and home prices. 
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Table 2. Net percentage changes in employment by ISIC sector in the NATO countries 
for both the 25 percent unilateral and multilateral reductions in military spending. 
Traded Indusrtries 
Belgium 
Luxembourg Canada Denmark France Germany italy Netherlands 
Unil. Multi, Unll. Multi. Unil. Multi. Unil. Mufti. Unil. Multi. Unil. Multi. Untl. Multi. 
Agr. For., & Fishing 






Furniture & Fixtures 
Paper & Paper Products 
Printing & Publishing 
Chemicals 
Petrol. & Rel. Prod. 
Rubber Products 
Nonmetallic MIn. Prod. 
Glass & Glass Products 







Mining & Quarrying 
Total Traded 
Nontrsded Industries 
Electdc, Gas & Water 
Construction 
Wholesale &Ret. Trade 
Transp., Stor., & Com, 
Fin., Ins. & Real Est. 
(I) 0.28 0.75 -0.03 0.83 0.32 0.71 0 .gO 1.15 0.65 0.88 0.38 0.48 0.15 0.64 
(310) 0.36 0.48 0.16 0.38 0.32 0.64 0.80 1.01 0.79 0.86 0.34 0.48 -0.05 0..30 
(321) 0.06 0.26 -020  -0.24 0.02 -0.01 0.42 0.83 0.06 0.35 0.20 0.50 -0.64 -0.60 
(322) 0.28 0.84 0.18 0.28 -0.24 -0.08 1.30 1.76 0.67 0.95 0.54 0.94 -1.51 -1.16 
(323) 0.15 0:41 -1.34 -0.36 -0.43 -0.24 1.06 1.74 0.05 0.52 0.14 0.59 0.25 0.71 
(324) -0.14 0.08 -0.01 0A8 0 .51  0.68 1.48 1.73 0.93 1.10 0.59 0.90 0.10 0.46 
(331) 0.15 0.38 -0.54 -0.19 0.27 0.50 0.15 0.55 0.47 0 .71  0.23 0.42 0.32 0.49 
(332) 0.71 0.77 0.15 0.38 0.43 0.68 0.95 1.07 0.89 1.05 0.60 0.76 0.16 0.30 
(341) 0.33 0.67 -0.61 -0.46 02.4 0.26 0.50 0.77 0.27 0.44 0.1g 0 .41  0.55 0.66 
(342) 0.11 0.25 -0.16 -0.12 0.23 0.21 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.15 -0.04 0.05 0.40 0.40 
(35A) 0.16 0.32 -0.63 -0.54 0.17 0.09 0 .31  0.40 -0.04 0.22 0.13 0.27 0.28 02.5 
(35B) -0.61 -0.38 -0.39 -0.38 -1.23 -1.25 0.42 0A2 1.35 1.29 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.41 
(355) 0.32 0.20 -1.12 -1.70 0.28 -0.03 0.13 0.00 0.18 0 .21  0.19 0.10 0.55 0.10 
(36A) 0.87 0.94 -0.21 -0.26 0.82 0.45 0.94 0.93 0.59 0.78 0.89 0.97 0.80 0.81 
(362) 1.16 1.22 -0.77 -0.96 0.69 0.09 0.63 0.63 0.47 1.16 0.56 0.75 0.52 0.31 
(371) 0.58 0.34 -0.87 -1.09 0.t3 -0.03 0.20 0.08 0.02 0.(30 0.06 -0.03 0.33 0.02 
(372) 0.94 1.00 -0.80 -1.00 0.18 -0.03 0.12 0.06 -0.01 0.08 0.14 0.16 0.30 0.06 
(381) 0.35 0.38 -0~57 -0.66 0.41 0.36 0.46 0.44 0.23 0 .31  0.25 0.33 0.42 0.34 
(382) -0.25 -0.08 -1.00 -0.96 0.69 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.40 0.50 0.18 0.37 -0.15 -0.18 
(383) -0.18 -0.39 -1.22 -1.87 -0.47 -0.92 -1.05 -1.33 0.00 -0.18 -0.36 -0.57 -0.02 -0.36 
(384) 0.19 -0.89 -1.41 -2.62 - t .10  -2.88 - t .36 -2.01 -0.46 -0.97 -0.78 -1.77 -0.55 -1.21 
(38A) 0.21 -0 . I t  -1.20 -1.88 0.29 -0.41 0.44 0.13 -0.50 -0.48 0.26 0.06 0.42 -0.10 
(2) 0.10 0.29 -0.56 -0.47 0.47 0.47 0.56 0.66 0.05 0.24 0.10 0.36 1.18 1.30 
0.26 0.26 -0.48 -0.41 0.10 0.14 0.30 0.34 0.22 0.26 0.18 0.20 0.10 0.12 
(4) 0.72 0.85 -0.27 -030 0.78 0.78 0.96 0 .91  0.62 0.60 0.27 0.25 0.81 0.78 
(5) 0.88 0.87 0.17 0.17 0.73 0.77 1.07 1.05 0.85 0.81 0.68 0.67 0.57 0.58 
(3) 1.27 1.24 0.27 0.24 0.92 0 .91  1.40 1.37 0.77 0.74 1.18 1.15 0.95 0.94 
(7) 0.27 0.26 -0.46 -0.49 0.24 0.25 0.39 0.38 0.25 0.24 0.23 0 .21  0.42 0A1 
(8) 0.62 0 .51  0.54 0.50 0.62 0.93 1.24 12.1 1.23 1.19 0.40 0.38 0.73 0.72 
Comm., Soc. & Pars. Sen/. (9) - 1.58 -1.57 02 .1  02.0 -0.92 -0.90 -2.09 -2.10 -1.15 -1.18 -1.80 -1.81 -1.05 -1.06 
Total Nontraded -0.09 -0.10 0.15 0.14 -0.06 -0.05 -0.14 -0.18 -0.12 -0.15 -0.12 -0.12 -0.03 -0.04 
Total, All Industries 0.01 0 .01  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .01  0 .01  0.00 0.00 0.01 0 .01  O.00 0.00 
(Continued) 
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Table 2. (Continued) 
Traded Indusrtrias 
Norway United Kingdom United States Portugal Spain Turkey 
Unll. Multi. UniL Multi, UnU. Multi. Unil. Multi, Unit. Multi. UnU.  Multi, 
Agr,, For., & Fishing 






Furniture & Fixtures 
Paper & Paper Products 
Pdnting & Publishing 
Chemicals 
Petrol & Ral. Prod, 
Rubber Products 
Nonmetallic Min. Prod. 
Glass & Gl~ss Products 







Mining & Quarrying 
Total Traded 
Nontraded industries 
Electric, Gas & Wster 
Construction 
Whoktsele & RSt. Trade 
Ti'ansp.. STY'., & Com. 
Fin., Ins. & Reel Est. 
Comm,, So(;, & Pets, Set','. (9) -2.35 -2.44 0.55 
ToP, el Nontraded -0.28 -0.35 0.31 
Total, All Industries 0,01 0.02 0.O13 
(1) 1.78 2.66 0.13 0.29 1.17 1.4t 0.81 0.83 0,35 0.40 0,35 0,37 
(310) 0.10 0,24 0.44 0.48 1,45 1,50 0,85 t.02 0.33 0.36 0.17 0,25 
(321) 0.94 1.54 -0,67 -0.33 0.32 0.42 0.18 0,26 0.28 0.27 -0.10 -0.07 
(322) 0.57 1.40 -0,43 -0.10 0.88 0.93 1,64 1.32 0,49 0.49 -0.04 0.03 
(323) 1,94 4.53 -0,58 -0.21 0,26 0.58 0,67 0.74 0,19 0.29 0,02 0.10 
(324) -0,10 0.43 0.26 0.41 1,37 1,45 1.43 1.53 0,40 0.42 0,60 0.57 
(331) 0,98 1,15 -0,17 0.21 0,49 0.58 0,25 0.44 0.30 0.35 -0,07 -0.08 
(332) 0,66 0.76 0,04 0.32 1.34 1,41 1,36 1,34 0.55 0.54 0,50 0,48 
(341) 0,22 0,53 -0.60 -0.39 0,43 0,50 0.50 0.82 0,05 0,08 --0,04 -0.69 
(342) 0,30 0.34 -0,05 0.02 0,58 0.39 -0,07 -0.12 -0,01 -0.01 -0,92 -0,06 
(35A) 0.34 0.41 -0,44 -0.21 -0,17 -0,14 0.13 0,10 -0,06 -0,07 0,16 0,02 
(35B) -0,05 0,01 -5.60 -5,32 0,41 0.40 -0.66 -0.24 -0,88 -1,04 -0 . t4  -0.06 
(355) 0.85 0.39 -1,48 -1,65 -0.61 -0,72 0.20 0,21 -0.27 -0.32 -0.03 -0.06 
(36A) 0.81 0.70 -0,33 -0.26 0,44 0.42 0.73 0,74 0,32 0.30 -0,08 -0.07 
(362) 0.47 0.24 -1.72 -1.70 -0.35 -0.40 0.37 0.36 -0.01 -0.03 0.14 0.11 
(371) 1.43 0,80 -0.95 -0,99 -0.96 -1.01 0.33 0.25 0.02 -0.03 -0,15 -0.23 
(372) 0.47 0.24 -2.35 -1.84 -1.44 -1.46 1.60 0.82 -0,09 -0.16 -0,32 -0.37 
(381) 0.75 0.60 -0.84 -0.59 -0.71 -0.73 0.64 0,65 0.14 0,13 0.00 -0.(35 
(382) 0.15 0,14 -0,24 -0.08 -0.59 -0.54 -0.06 -0.03 -0.13 -0.12 -0.19 -0,25 
(383) -0.73 -1 2.4 -1.90 -2.09 -3,29 -3,38 -0.16 -0,22 -0.37 -0.40 -0.03 -0.87 
(384) -0.31 -1.05 -1.72 -2.33 -2.86 -3.07 -0.18 -0,24 -0,38 -0.45 -0.38 -0.39 
(38A) 0.28 -0.08 -1.32 -1.44 -2,59 -2.67 0.47 0,36 0.07 0,0! -0.14 -0.19 
(2) 4,37 537 -0,61 -0.21 0.19 0,23 -3.59 -3,49 -0.26 -0,22 0.50 -0.11 
0.74 0,93 -0,70 -0,68 -0,48 -0A4 0,64 0,68 0,20 0,22 0.29 0,31 
(4) 1.69 1.44 -1.33 -1.35 1.13 1.12 0.10 0.11 0.04 0,00 -0,08 -0.13 
(5) 0,99 0.94 0.42 0.39 0.71 0.70 0.87 0.67 0.35 0,33 -0.07 -0.06 
(6) 1,65 1.53 0,57 0.55 1.30 1 2.0 2.00 1,91 0.67 0,85 02.8 0.24 
(7} 0.68 0.63 -0,88 -0.88 02.3 0.22 0.41 0,40 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.15 
(8) 0.77 0.72 0.17 0.16 1.49 1.4S 1.25 1,19 0.84 0,81 0.58 0.47 
0,55 -1,06 -1,06 -3,81 -3.67 -1.79 - t .80  -2,08 -2,12 
0,3t 0,17 0.16 -0.72 -0.76 -0,16 -0.10 -0,74 -0.79 
0.00 0,01 0,01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.G0 
The sectoral results for the other NATO countries are qualitatively 
similar to those for the U.S. in the sense of being relatively small 
on the whole and being concentrated in metal products and durable 
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goods. The results are by no means uniform, however, and apparently 
reflect some noteworthy differences in the sectoral incidence of military 
spending and technological differences in input-output structures. 
4.2. Scenario 2 : 2 5  percent multilateral reduction in NATO countries 
combined 
Here we summarize the results of a proportional shift of 25 percent of 
military expenditures across all categories of final demand for all the 
NATO countries combined. 
The aggregate results of the multilateral reductions for the individual 
NATO countries are listed in Table 1 together with the results of the 
unilateral reductions. The aggregate results of the multilateral reduc- 
tions are listed in Table 3 for all 34 countries included in the Michigan 
Model. The sectoral results of the multilateral reductions for the indi- 
vidual NATO countries are listed in Table 2 together with the sectoral 
results of the unilateral reductions. 
For the United States, it appears that, in the aggregate, a multilateral 
reduction in military spending in the NATO countries has a somewhat 
smaller impact on U.S. exports and imports than does a unilateral 
reduction. 11 The labor dislocation is virtually the same in the two cases 
while the U.S. terms of trade improve somewhat more with the multilat- 
eral reductions. The results for the United Kingdom are similar to those 
for the United States. For the other NATO countries, there are numer- 
ous instances in which the multilateral reductions have a somewhat 
larger trade and labor dislocation impact than the unilateral reductions 
in military expenditures. But in all cases, these changes are relatively 
small in percentage terms. 
The aggregate results in Table 3, which includes all 34 countries cov- 
ered in the Michigan Model, indicate that the non-NATO countries would 
not be particularly affected by the unilateral/multilateral reductions in 
NATO country military expenditures. 
The sectoral results, which are listed in Table 2, indicate slightly larger 
net percentage changes in employment for the multilateral reductions. 
But on the whole, the results for both experiments are qualitatively 
very similar. 
5. Conclusions and implications 
In the long run, a reduction in defense spending is generally regarded 
to have a positive impact on an economy. In the short run, how- 
ever, a reduction in defense outlays could result in unemployment and 
SECTORAL EFFECTS OF REDUCTIONS IN NATO MILITARY EXPENDITURES 265 
Table 3. Summary of effects on the major industrialized and developing countries due to 
a 25 percent multilateral reduction in military expenditures in each of the NATO countries. 
Value of Change Value of Change Gross Change % Change in Pct Change Pct Change 
in Exports in Imports in employment a Terms of Trade in Eft.. in 
Ex, Rate D Prices c
$ Mill. Pct $ Mill. Pet 000 Wkr Pct 
Industrialized Countries 
Australia 66.7 0.3 10.4 0.1 5.8 0.09 0,23 0.0 0.1 
Austria -0.4 -0.0 3.2 0.0 3.0 0.10 -0.00 -0.t  0.0 
Canada -264.0 -0.4 -208,3 -0.4 21.8 0.20 0.10 0.1 -0.0 
European Community 
Belgiurn/ 
Luxembourg 130.3 0.2 117.3 0.2 19.3 0.49 -0.03 0.1 -0.1 
Denmark 11.8 0.1 26.2 0.1 9.3 0.39 0.08 0.2 -0.1 
France 259.7 0.2 206.4 0.2 138.! 0.65 -0.05 0.1 -0.1 
Germany 339.5 0.2 104.6 0.1 110.5 0.40 -0.12 0.1 -0.2 
Ireland -5.4 -0.1 3.0 0.0 0.7 0.06 0.09 0.4 -0.0 
Italy 204.3 0.3 172.7 0.2 95.7 0.47 -0.05 0.1 -0.2 
Netherlands 73,7 0.1 86.9 0.1 19.1 0.39 0.02 -0.1 0.t 
United Kingdom -437.3 -0.4 -481,4 -0,4 79,5 0.32 -0.05 -0.5 0.5 
Total EC 576.7 0.1 235.8 0.0 472.2 0.44 -0.06 -0.0 -0.0 
Finland 23.1 0.2 3.6 0.0 2,0 0,09 0.05 0.0 0.1 
Japan 253.0 0.2 -184.0 -0.1 28.2 0.05 -0.32 -0.2 0.1 
New Zealand -4.9 -0.1 12.0 0.2 1.0 0.08 0.29 0.3 -0.0 
Norway 63.8 0.4 48.1 0.3 15.1 0,79 0,05 0,0 0.1 
Sweden -5,6 -0.0 5.1 0.0 2.8 0.07 -0.05 0.0 0.0 
Switzerland -60,2 -0.2 2.2 0.0 2.6 0.08 -0,01 0.1 -0,0 
United States -781.9 -0.3 -541.6 -0.2 582.9 0.59 0.05 0.1 0,1 
Total Industrialized -133.7 -0.0 -613,4 -0.0 1137.2  0.37 --0.04 -0.0 0.0 
Developing Countries 
Argentina 28.3 0.3 63.5 0.6 7.9 0.08 0.38 0.0 -0.1 
Brazil 122.2 0.6 143.0 0.6 50,9 0.12 0.10 0.0 -0.3 
Chile 20.2 0.4 24.4 0.3 1.9 0.06 0.08 0,0 0.1 
Colombia 17.5 0,4 33.6 0,7 7.2 0.13 0.34 0.0 -0.1 
Greece 29.7 0.5 43.8 0.4 4.3 0.11 0.17 0.0 -0.1 
Hong Kong -0.8 -0.0 -2.5 -0.0 2.2 0.11 -0.02 0.1 -0.0 
India 13.9 0,2 18.3 0.3 18,4 0.01 0.08 0.0 -0.0 
(Continued) 
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Table 3. (Continued) 
Value of Change Value of Change Gross Change % (3hange in 
in Exports in Imports in employment a Terms of Trade 
$ Mill. Pct $ Mill. Pct 000 Wkr Pct 
Pct Ch&nge Pct Change 
in Eft. in 
Ex. Rate b Prices c 
israel -3.2 -0.1 1.5 0.0 0.7 0.05 0.07 0.1 -0.0 
South Korea 6.5 0.0 -5.7 -0.0 4.4 0.03 -0.06 0.0 0.0 
Mexico 1.0 0.0 16,2 0.1 5.4 0.03 0.08 0.0 0.0 
Portugal. 12.0 0.2 12.8 0.1 27.5 0.70 0.02 0.0 0.1 
Singapore 21.5 0.1 5.8 0.0 0.5 0.05 0.02 0.0 0.0 
Spain -22.3 -0,1 -35.9 -0,1 35.2 0,32 -0.05 0.0 0.1 
Talwan 0.0 0.1 1.9 0.0 0.3 0.00 0.01 0.0 -0.0 
Turkey -12.0 -0.4 -3.1 -0.0 37.9 0.26 0.25 0.0 0.4 
Yugoslavia 5.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.8 0.01 -0.03 -0.0 0.0 
Total 
Developing 239.8 0.1 321.2 0.1 205.6 0.04 0.09 0.0 -0.0 
All Countries 106.1 0.0 -292.2 -0.0 1342.7 0.12 -0.02 -0.0 0.0 
Notes: a Refers to sum of changes in the home and export sectors within industries. 
b Positive = appreciation. 
c Index of import and home prices. 
adjustment pressures in at least some sectors of the economy, in or- 
der to facilitate a smooth transition, government assistance, if deemed 
necessary, should be pointed in the right direction. 
Our results suggest that, while the impacts of a 25 percent unilateral 
or multilateral reduction in military expenditures do not appear to be 
large in the aggregate, 12 the negative sectoral net employment impacts 
appear to be concentrated in certain specific sectors, such as basic 
metals and metal products, durable goods industries, and community, 
social, and personal services. Depending on the magnitude of the 
reduction in military expenditures and the time horizon involved with 
respect to adjustment, these particular sectors might be in need of as- 
sistance in the event that reduced military spending were in fact carried 
out. 13 Indeed, the availability of such assistance could be important in 
garnering political support for the military expenditure reductions. 
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Notes 
1. As will become clear from the discussion that follows, we can use our modeling 
framework to analyze increases, as well as reductions, in military spending. 
2. There may, of course, be other effects at both the micro and aggregate levels that our 
modeling approach cannot capture. These effects include the dynamics of adjustment 
in goods and factor markets and possible impacts working through financial markets 
and changes in aggregate savings and investment behavior. This suggests the need 
for a broader and more integrated modeling effort, which unfortunately is beyond our 
capability at present. 
3. The countries and industries are listed in Table 3. It should be noted that the European 
Community is represented as the EC-9, and that Greece, Portugal, and Spain are 
listed in the group of developing countries. Also, the results for Germany refer only 
to West Germany, and those for Yugoslavia refer to that entire nation. 
4. As will be discussed below, our sector aggregates may obscure technological differ- 
ences in the production of military and nonmilitary goods in certain sectors. 
5. A fourth possibility is that the government could contract the money supply (or 
reduce its rate of expansion). The results would then depend on what accompanying 
changes maintain full employment. If there were a general deflation of prices and 
wages, this would increase the real value of all components of spending across the 
board, similar to the proportional expansion assumed here. 
6. By a unilateral reduction, we mean a reduction in a given NATO country, while other 
NATO countries continue military spending at the old level. A multilateral reduction 
means a coordinated reduction at the same time in all of the NATO countries. 
7. See Haveman, Deardorff, and Stern (1992) for further elaboration of the procedure 
used here. 
8. Of course, inputs from other sectors are typically more important than inputs from 
the same industry represented here. Other than this input-price effect, the Michigan 
Model does not include any direct effect of the home price on export supply, or vice 
versa, since capital is assumed specific to each subsector and labor can be hired 
independently in each. 
9. The sectoral changes in exports and imports are available from the authors on 
request. 
10. It should be noted that military personnel are included in sector 9, which means 
that we assume the military employs workers in the same proportion as all other 
components of sector 9. The results presented will thus be understated or overstated, 
depending on the difference in labor as a fraction of spending in each component 
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of sector 9. Nonetheless, correction for these inaccuracies would not change the 
qualitative nature of the results. 
11. With a multilateral reduction in spending, all. NATO countries shift spending toward 
tradable sectors, which raises their world prices relative to nontradables. This tends 
to expand trade in all of the countries, compared to the effects under unilateral military 
spending reductions. Thus in the United States, when trade falls, it falls by less in 
the multilateral case, while in France and Germany, when trade expands, it expands 
by more. 
12. Dunne (1991) reaches similar conclusions to ours using an empirical analysis based 
on regression methods, as well as citing the results of earlier studies based on 
input-output methods. 
13. See: Fox and Stern (1993) for a more detailed analysis of the effects of reductions 
in NATO military expenditures on U.B. employment by sector/occupation/region and 
for calculation of associated wage losses. 
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